Research
Peer-reviewed Publications
Meta-Analysis & the Integration of Terrorism Event Databases
Timothy L. Jones “Meta-Analysis & the Integration of Terrorism Event Databases,” International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism (IJCWT) 13 (1), 1-20. Publisher’s Version
Abstract
Why do terrorist attacks occur in certain places and times but not others? Despite advances in collection and empirical methods, the literature has produced divergent results and reached little consensus for common hypotheses about the economic, political, and social causes of terrorism. It is hard to know what to make disagreements as studies adopt disparate research designs using different datasets covering different locations and times. This article applies the xSub data protocol to conduct a meta-analysis of terrorism event datasets and isolate explanations for variations in findings. Although the datasets are constructed for different purposes by different research teams, with different inclusion standards, processing data onto a common event typology, and conducting analysis across common coverage reduces heterogeneity in findings. This protocol also facilitates comparisons with general conflict event datasets, providing researchers, policymakers, and practitioners with a broader context for understanding terrorism in relation to other forms of violence.Editor-reviewed Publications
Peace Agreements and the Persuasive Authority of International Law
Gregory H. Fox & Timothy L. Jones “Peace Agreements and the Persuasive Authority of International Law,” Minnesota Journal of International Law, (forthcoming).
Abstract
Non-international armed conflicts, or “NIACs,” are the most common form of warfare in the contemporary era. Not surprisingly, agreements ending NIACs are the most common type of peace agreement. But NIAC agreements appear permanently suspended in an international legal limbo: they do not qualify as binding treaties and neither international actors nor scholars agree on another legal status.This article is the second in a series to explore alternatives to the binding/non-binding dichotomy in understanding NIAC agreements’ relation to international law. We collected and coded all final NIAC agreements from 1991 to 2017 for incorporation of a range of international law principles, grouped primarily as those related to governance in the post-conflict state and those pertaining to transitional justice. We proposed a series of hypotheses as to why some agreements might have higher rates of incorporation and some lower.
Our primary findings reveal: (i) a notable increase in the incorporation of transitional justice principles, not governance principles, when the United Nations assumes roles such as party, mediator, observer, or witness; (ii) a decrease in international law incorporation, when regional organizations are involved in any capacity; and (iii) an associated decrease in overall international law incorporation, specifically governance principles, as conflicts become more lethal or focus on territorial disputes.
The UN’s association with higher inclusion of international norms, as well as the ubiquity of including governance norms when any third party joins a NIAC peace process, casts the agreements as important vehicles for implementing and enforcing international legal principles. This role for international law is not dependent on the agreements’ formal status. But the critical participation of the UN -- an organization not only built on fidelity to international law but that instructs its representatives to employ international law as a framework for peace process -- is also a marker of this role’s fragility. Recent gridlock in the UN may have dire implications for this mode of legal influence.
General Audience Publications
What the candidates can learn from two former presidents about foreign policy
Timothy L. Jones “What the candidates can learn from two former presidents about foreign policy,” [w/ David Dezso] The Hill, 21 January, 2024. Link
Working Papers
Under Pressure: Diversification in Rebel Strategies, under review.
Abstract
In civil wars, some rebel groups focus attacks against state forces, others emphasize the targeting of civilian population, and still others combine strategies. Why do some rebels diversify portfolios of violence at certain times and appear to specialize during other periods? Little attention has been paid to why and when rebels bundle different forms of violent contention. This article proposes that rebels expand and contract targets and use of force in response to fluctuations in pressure from government forces. I find consistent support this theory across 623 rebel groups in 30 civil wars spanning 25 countries from 1997 to 2021. Diversification appears to serve several purposes, stretching state resources, circumventing defensive measures, and improving rebel group survivability. When leveraging a natural experiment from decapitation strikes in Pakistan, I find that diversification in response to external pressure better explains outcomes than alternative theories, such as principal-agent problems. However, the benefits of diversification appear to come at the expense of rebels realizing strategic objectives. These findings offer new insight into adaptive behavior of rebel groups, with important implications for the formation and evaluation of policies and countermeasures aimed at preventing and managing conflict.The Dynamics of Territorial Control and Wartime Aid [co-author with Daniel Karell, Yale University]
Abstract
Developmental aid has become a de facto policy tool for the United States and its allies in attempts to reduce violence in conflict-ridden areas. However, its effectiveness as part of a broader counterinsurgency strategy remains inconclusive. This paper contributes to the discourse on the impact of developmental aid in war-torn communities and its intersection with counterinsurgency strategies, offering new insights and data to assess whether territorial control is a prerequisite for stabilizing conflict-affected regions through aid or whether aid itself can foster peace in contested areas. We integrate newly compiled estimates of territorial control across Afghanistan with data from the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which aimed to enhance access to essential services and promote democratic governance in rural villages, particularly among marginalized members of communities. Our findings indicate that the introduction of aid without first securing and holding territory leads to increases in insurgent violence. Conversely, delivering aid following successful counterinsurgency operations that establish security lead to a reduction in violence. Importantly, we also find that government-controlled areas remained vulnerable to increased rebel attacks in the absence of aid incentives, particularly as the conflict endured and insurgent forces gained strength. These results enhance our understanding of resource allocation dynamics in conflict zones and emphasize the importance of sequencing interventions and how both security efforts and aid work together. By clarifying the conditions that determine the success or failure of aid interventions, this study contributes to the study of conflict management and peacebuilding, offering valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners.Taking Out the Competition: Lessons from Algeria on Rebel Targeting of Nonviolent Resistance Campaigns [co-author with Martin Macias-Medellin, University of Michigan]
Abstract
To what extent does competition shape rebel behavior in civil war? While scholars have increasingly scrutinized the impact of multiple armed rebel groups on conflict dynamics, this study also considers a less examined aspect: the influence of nonviolent rivals. We posit that rebel groups strategically target high-profile social personalities during periods of fragmented opposition, viewing them as a threat to their political relevance and authority, to bolster their support base, and eliminate alternative means to challenge the state. As nonviolent resistance campaigns diminish or disappear, rebel groups pivot their attention towards targeting rival militant factions, state security forces, and the general population. Our theory is substantiated through an original dataset detailing violent events in Algeria from 1988 to 2001, supplemented by a large-N analysis encompassing 36 civil wars spanning from 1972 to 2020. This research sheds new light on the targeting behavior of rebel groups and underscores the significance of considering both violent and nonviolent dimensions in understanding civil conflict dynamics.Changes: Patterns of Violence in Civil War