Timothy L. Jones

Timothy L. Jones

Political Scientist studying armed conflict, intelligence, special opeartions, irregular warfare, terrorism, geospatial data science

Research

Peer-reviewed Publications

Frogmen and Fast Boats: The Future of Irregular Warfare in the Maritime Domain Timothy L. Jones [co-author with John Willingham and Kenneth Walls], Inter Populum Journal of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations Fall 2025, 3(2), 1-27 Publisher’s Version

Abstract This article examines how Irregular Warfare in the Maritime domain (IW-M) can strengthen national defense strategies for smaller states confronting more powerful naval adversaries. It argues that integrating special operations forces (SOF) into IW-M efforts provides a cost-effective, adaptable approach to defending littoral spaces, imposing costs, and enhancing deterrence. Drawing on historical examples and contemporary force design, this article identifies key conditions for success: strategic purpose, political backing, feasible objectives, and SOF integration. It offers practical insights for defense planners, emphasizing how purpose-built SOF units can address gaps in conventional naval posture. The article also highlights opportunities for SOF to assist partners through training, joint exercises, and low-cost technological adaptation. As great power competition increasingly plays out in contested waters, IW-M offers policymakers and military leaders a scalable, flexible toolset to counter aggression, defend sovereignty, and improve regional resilience—particularly where conventional options may be limited, unaffordable, or politically constrained.

Meta-Analysis & the Integration of Terrorism Event Databases
Timothy L. Jones “Meta-Analysis & the Integration of Terrorism Event Databases,” International Journal of Cyber Warfare & Terrorism (IJCWT) 13 (1), 1-20. Publisher’s Version

Abstract Why do terrorist attacks occur in certain places and times but not others? Despite advances in collection and empirical methods, the literature has produced divergent results and reached little consensus for common hypotheses about the economic, political, and social causes of terrorism. It is hard to know what to make disagreements as studies adopt disparate research designs using different datasets covering different locations and times. This article applies the xSub data protocol to conduct a meta-analysis of terrorism event datasets and isolate explanations for variations in findings. Although the datasets are constructed for different purposes by different research teams, with different inclusion standards, processing data onto a common event typology, and conducting analysis across common coverage reduces heterogeneity in findings. This protocol also facilitates comparisons with general conflict event datasets, providing researchers, policymakers, and practitioners with a broader context for understanding terrorism in relation to other forms of violence.

Editor-reviewed Publications

Peace Agreements and the Persuasive Authority of International Law
Gregory H. Fox & Timothy L. Jones “Peace Agreements and the Persuasive Authority of International Law,” Minnesota Journal of International Law, 34 (1) 1-86. Publisher’s Version

Abstract Non-international armed conflicts, or “NIACs,” are the most common form of warfare in the contemporary era. Not surprisingly, agreements ending NIACs are the most common type of peace agreement. But NIAC agreements appear permanently suspended in an international legal limbo: they do not qualify as binding treaties and neither international actors nor scholars agree on another legal status.

This article is the second in a series to explore alternatives to the binding/non-binding dichotomy in understanding NIAC agreements’ relation to international law. We collected and coded all final NIAC agreements from 1991 to 2017 for incorporation of a range of international law principles, grouped primarily as those related to governance in the post-conflict state and those pertaining to transitional justice. We proposed a series of hypotheses as to why some agreements might have higher rates of incorporation and some lower.

Our primary findings reveal: (i) a notable increase in the incorporation of transitional justice principles, not governance principles, when the United Nations assumes roles such as party, mediator, observer, or witness; (ii) a decrease in international law incorporation, when regional organizations are involved in any capacity; and (iii) an associated decrease in overall international law incorporation, specifically governance principles, as conflicts become more lethal or focus on territorial disputes.

The UN’s association with higher inclusion of international norms, as well as the ubiquity of including governance norms when any third party joins a NIAC peace process, casts the agreements as important vehicles for implementing and enforcing international legal principles. This role for international law is not dependent on the agreements’ formal status. But the critical participation of the UN -- an organization not only built on fidelity to international law but that instructs its representatives to employ international law as a framework for peace process -- is also a marker of this role’s fragility. Recent gridlock in the UN may have dire implications for this mode of legal influence.

General Audience Publications

What the candidates can learn from two former presidents about foreign policy
Timothy L. Jones “What the candidates can learn from two former presidents about foreign policy,” [w/ David Dezso] The Hill, 21 January, 2024. Link

Submitted Papers

Adapting Under Pressure: Diversification of Rebel Violence in Civil Wars, Revise & Resubmit

Abstract Why do some rebel groups diversify portfolios of violence while others specialize? This article argues that repertoire expansion reflects adaptation to fluctuating external state pressure. Analysis of 623 groups across 30 civil wars shows that moderate pressure prompts broader targeting and force combinations, while high pressure contracts portfolios. A natural experiment from Pakistan’s drone campaign reveals diversification—rather than substitution toward softer targets—follows leadership losses. Diversification is correlated with increased operational tempo and survivability but appears to hinder strategic success. These findings advance understanding of civil war dynamics and conditions under which state coercion can inadvertently sustain rebel violence.

The Sequencing of Territorial Control and Wartime Aid [co-author with Daniel Karell, Yale University] Under Review

Abstract How does development aid affect the security environment in civil war, and under what conditions can it contribute to stabilization? We examine these questions using twelve years of fine-grained monthly estimates of territorial control across Afghanistan, paired with records of more than 63,000 projects from the National Solidarity Program, a community-driven aid initiative. We show that the security effects of aid are conditional on territorial control. In areas under sustained government control, project completion is associated with increased discovery of weapons and explosives and reduced violence. In contested areas, development aid coincides with reduced information flows and higher violence. This suggests that development does not generate unconditional increases in civilian reporting but instead improves the efficiency of counterinsurgents once the state has established control. Complementary evidence from a randomized evaluation supports these findings. This finding helps reconcile divergent results in the literature by emphasizing the sequencing of security and aid.

Selected Works in Progress

Taking Out the Competition: Lessons from Algeria on Rebel Targeting of Non-violent Rivals [co-author with Martin Macias-Medellin, University of Michigan]

Abstract To what extent does competition shape rebel behavior in civil war? While scholars have increasingly scrutinized the impact of multiple armed rebel groups on conflict dynamics, this study considers a less examined aspect: the influence of non-violent rivals. We posit that rebel groups strategically target high-profile social personalities during periods of fragmented opposition, viewing them as a threat to their political relevance and authority, to bolster their support base, and eliminate alternative means to challenge the state. As non-violent campaigns diminish or disappear, rebel groups pivot their attention towards targeting rival militant factions, state security forces, and the general population. Our theory is substantiated through an original dataset detailing violent events in Algeria from 1988 to 2001. This research sheds new light on the targeting behavior of rebel groups and underscores the significance of considering both violent and non-violent dimensions in understanding civil conflict dynamics.

Securing Decision Dominance: The Role of Special Intelligence in Complex Environments

Abstract In a rapidly converging and volatile threat environment, special intelligence must evolve to meet the complex demands facing Special Operations Forces (SOF). This paper explores the critical role of intelligence in enabling SOF to deter adversaries, disrupt hostile operations, and build partner resilience in regions vital to strategic competition. Special intelligence must become more actionable, integrated, and resilient. It must deliver accurate, timely, and operationally relevant insights, foster a high level of synergy between intelligence and operations, and maintain a comprehensive understanding of adversaries and environments. The study further investigates how intelligence frameworks can leverage emerging technologies and optimize interagency and multinational networks to enhance agility and decision dominance in peacetime competition and crisis. Innovation, speed, flexibility, and high connectivity are emphasized as essential traits for adapting to the fast-evolving technological and operational landscape. Special intelligence must not only support immediate tactical objectives but also contribute to strategic deterrence and long-term stability. Ultimately, this article argues that the future effectiveness of special intelligence rests on its ability to adapt rapidly, integrate widely, and deliver decisive, asymmetrical advantages in an increasingly contested global security environment.

Signaling in the Dark: The Opacity Dilemma and the SOF–Cyber–Space Triad

Abstract Can capabilities designed to operate in the shadows credibly deter? Contemporary U.S. strategy increasingly invokes an "irregular triad" of special operations forces (SOF), cyber capabilities, and space systems as a pillar of integrated deterrence. Yet deterrence theory has largely developed in domains where military strength and signaling visibility reinforce one another. Capabilities whose effectiveness depends on concealment, deniability, and protected architectures would appear, at first glance, ill suited to generate observable and credible commitment. This article develops a framework for understanding deterrence in secrecy-dependent domains. I contend that these capabilities face a structural tradeoff, an opacity dilemma, in which operational effectiveness increases with concealment, while deterrence relies on credible signaling, attribution, and legible commitment. To specify the conditions under which such capabilities can reinforce deterrence, the article evaluates SOF–cyber–space activity along three dimensions: observability, reversibility, and escalation risk. The findings show that secrecy-dependent capabilities can contribute to deterrence when embedded within a broader, visible signaling architecture, but risk weakening extended deterrence and crisis stability when treated as substitutes for overt commitments. The argument identifies a boundary condition of contemporary deterrence: where visibility erodes operational strength, capability and signaling cannot be jointly maximized. The findings carry implications for U.S. deterrence efforts and the study of coercive bargaining, secrecy in international politics, alliance reassurance, and escalation management.